India's nuclear-energy expansion: the three-stage programme, SMRs, and civil-nuclear liability reform

The state of play as of 6 July 2026

India’s nuclear enterprise is run by the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), which per its own description covers “development of nuclear power technology which includes exploration, identification and processing of uranium resources,” fuel fabrication, heavy-water production, reactor operation, reprocessing and waste management (DAE). The Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL) operates the civil fleet: 24 reactors totalling about 8,180 MWe across seven sites in early 2026, according to figures attributed to NPCIL. The World Nuclear Association’s May 2026 country profile lists 24 operable units at 7,935 MWe and eight units under construction at about 6,028 MWe (World Nuclear Association); the two figures differ slightly by rounding and reference date, and the same profile puts nuclear at roughly 2 to 3 percent of India’s electricity. NPCIL has stated a near-term build-out toward about 22,480 MWe by 2031-32 as reactors under construction in Gujarat, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Haryana, Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh come online.

Over this near-term fleet sits a far larger stated ambition: “at least 100 GW of nuclear energy by 2047,” announced by the current Finance Minister in the Union Budget 2025-26 speech in February 2025 as “essential for our energy transition efforts” (World Nuclear Association). This brief characterises three moving parts of that plan and the range of positions attached to each: the three-stage programme, the Nuclear Energy Mission and small modular reactors, and the 2025 liability and regulatory reform.

The three-stage programme and the PFBR milestone

India’s long-term nuclear doctrine is the three-stage programme, designed decades ago to leverage India’s limited uranium but very large thorium reserves. As summarised by the World Nuclear Association, Stage 1 uses pressurised heavy-water reactors (PHWRs) fuelled by natural uranium, which also produce plutonium; Stage 2 uses fast breeder reactors that burn that plutonium with uranium and thorium blankets to breed further plutonium and uranium-233; and Stage 3 envisages advanced heavy-water reactors running thorium-plutonium and thorium-uranium-233 fuels in a closed cycle (World Nuclear Association).

The programme reached a long-delayed Stage 2 marker in 2026. The 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam, operated by BHAVINI, began fuel loading in October 2025 and attained first criticality in April 2026, according to the World Nuclear Association profile. Positions on what this means diverge: official and industry accounts present it as the practical start of the fast-breeder stage that the whole thorium strategy depends on, while long-standing outside commentary has noted that Stage 3 and full thorium utilisation remain research-scale, with the advanced heavy-water reactor not yet built. This brief does not forecast timelines; it records that Stage 2 has a criticality milestone and that Stage 3 remains developmental.

The Nuclear Energy Mission and small modular reactors

The Union Budget 2025-26 launched a Nuclear Energy Mission for what the government calls Viksit Bharat. Widely reported budget figures put a Rs 20,000 crore allocation on research and development for small modular reactors (SMRs), with a stated aim of at least five indigenously designed and operational SMRs by 2033 (PIB). Alongside SMRs, the DAE has described work on Bharat Small Reactors — 220 MWe PHWRs adapted from a proven design and intended for deployment including at industrial sites — and on advanced designs such as high-temperature gas-cooled reactors for hydrogen co-generation and molten-salt reactors aimed at thorium.

The mission is framed around private participation as much as new technology. Government and analyst accounts converge on the point that meeting a 100 GW target from a base near 8 GW would require capital and delivery capacity beyond the public utilities alone; the stated rationale is energy security and clean baseload power (Norton Rose Fulbright). Whether private industry enters at scale depended on removing two long-standing barriers written into law: the state monopoly on nuclear operation, and the supplier-liability provisions that foreign and domestic vendors had objected to since 2010. Both were addressed by the December 2025 statute described below.

The SHANTI Act: liability and regulatory reform

The most consequential 2025 development is legislative. The Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Bill, 2025 was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 15 December 2025, passed by the Lok Sabha on 17 December and by the Rajya Sabha on 18 December 2025, and received presidential assent on 20 December 2025 (PRS Legislative Research; World Nuclear News). According to PRS and independent legal analysis, the Act repeals both the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 and replaces them with a single framework.

On ownership, the Act ends the state monopoly on licensing. Where previously only government entities could be licensed for atomic-mineral mining and nuclear-substance production, the Act permits licences to “any other company, except a company incorporated outside India,” to joint ventures between government and private entities, and to individuals with central-government approval, for activities including building and operating nuclear facilities and fuel fabrication and transport (PRS). Foreign-incorporated companies remain barred from being licensees, a point critics and supporters read differently on how far the sector is genuinely “opened.”

On liability, the Act restructures operator liability into tiers based on reactor capacity, ranging from Rs 100 crore to Rs 3,000 crore, in place of the earlier fixed cap of Rs 1,500 crore (PRS). It removes the operator’s right of recourse against suppliers for defective equipment or material — the provision, drawn from Section 17(b) of the 2010 CLND Act, that suppliers had long cited as a deterrent — and preserves recourse only where it is expressly written into a contract or where an individual acted with intent to cause nuclear damage (Norton Rose Fulbright). Positions on this diverge sharply: proponents describe it as removing the barrier that stalled supplier contracts and foreign reactor deals for a decade, while critics argue that narrowing supplier recourse weakens the deterrent and shifts risk toward operators and, ultimately, the public. On regulation, the Act confers statutory status on the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board — previously an executive body — constituting it with a chairperson, one full-time member and up to seven part-time members appointed by the central government; here too observers disagree on whether the board is sufficiently independent of the DAE it regulates.

Diplomacy and strategic context

India’s civil nuclear expansion sits on the 2008 framework: a Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver and the India-United States civil nuclear agreement reopened international cooperation for India’s separated civilian facilities (World Nuclear Association). The Kudankulam plant in Tamil Nadu, built with Russian VVER-1000 reactors, is the largest single station in India, with further units under construction (Kudankulam profile). Because the DAE is also the technical base underpinning India’s strategic programme and its pursuit of strategic autonomy in energy and technology, its choices carry weight well beyond the electricity sector.

Who owns this topic (and why we’re here)

The Department of Atomic Energy owns this topic in the literal sense: it holds the mandate, the laboratories (led by BARC), the fuel cycle and, through NPCIL and BHAVINI, the reactor fleet, with policy set by the Atomic Energy Commission (DAE). The Ministry of Finance set the funding envelope through the Nuclear Energy Mission in the Union Budget 2025-26, the Ministry of Power is the destination for the electricity, and Parliament reset the legal architecture through the SHANTI Act in December 2025. IndiaStand maintains this brief because nuclear energy is where India’s 2047 energy-transition target, its opening of a formerly closed strategic sector to private capital, and its long-running thorium doctrine now intersect. We track the institution and the law, attribute every claim, and make no forecast about whether the 100 GW target is met.

Maintained topic brief. Analysis by IndiaStand — it characterises the state of play and the range of positions actually held, attributes each claim, and makes no forecast and no recommendation.