Independent India intelligence · sourced and maintained
Sourced India intelligence for the questions your organisation needs answered.
Tell us what you need to understand about India, where you are exposed and when you need an answer. We establish what is documented, what changed, who is responsible, where the evidence conflicts and what remains unknown — on a maintained record of every Indian ministry, state and institution, with a source on every claim. We describe and explain; we do not predict or advise.
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What we cover
90 desks live · scaling to ~170Every executive department of the Government of India — remit, structure and record.
All 28 states and 8 union territories as federal actors.
Armed forces, space, defence R&D, intelligence, paramilitary — and the judiciary.
Constitutional bodies, regulators, parties and key organisations.
Bilateral relationships and cross-cutting geopolitical domains.
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All 91 briefsMaintained analyses across the Republic — elections, defence, foreign policy, energy, the courts, the economy.
The Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls
The Special Intensive Revision (SIR) is a house-to-house re-enumeration of India's electoral rolls that the Election Commission began in Bihar in June 2025 and has extended nationwide. As of 7 October 2026 the Commission says it is complete in 20 states and UTs, with final rolls pending in 12 Phase III states; draft-roll exclusions run from 19% to 21% in Karnataka and Maharashtra. The Supreme Court upheld the Bihar exercise in May 2026. Since September the dispute has turned onto the Commission itself: a newspaper investigation reporting that two of three Commissioners objected on record to SIR decisions, protests demanding the Chief Election Commissioner's resignation, a Supreme Court notice on how the Commission decides, and a row over a declaration added to Form 6. This is the maintained topic brief on where it stands.
Defence self-reliance: indigenisation and exports
Defence self-reliance — Atmanirbharta — is the organising goal of India's defence-industrial policy: build at home what the armed forces once imported, and sell the surplus abroad. As of mid-2026 the Ministry of Defence reports the value of defence production at about ₹1.78 lakh crore and record exports of ₹38,424 crore for FY2025-26, on a policy scaffold of the Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020, positive indigenisation lists, iDEX and two defence corridors. The headline curve is steep; the contested questions are how "indigenous" is counted, how much high-end dependence remains, and how the ₹3 lakh crore production and ₹50,000 crore export targets the ministry has set for 2029 are tracking. Since July 2026 the ministry has added a sixth DPSU indigenisation list of 405 items, loosened defence-export licensing, and approved transfer of DRDO's conventional-missile technology to industry. This is the maintained topic brief.
India's strategic autonomy: the state of play
Strategic autonomy — India's refusal to bind itself to any single power bloc — was on public display in September 2026: within a fortnight India attended the SCO summit in Bishkek, hosted a Quad Sherpas' meeting, and chaired the BRICS summit in New Delhi where the Presidents of China and Russia each met the Prime Minister, before a leaders' call with the US President on 30 September. SIPRI's March 2026 data puts numbers on the hedge underneath: Russia's share of Indian arms imports has fallen from 70% in 2011-15 to 40% in 2021-25, while India remains the single largest buyer of Russian arms. This is the maintained topic brief on how India is holding the line and where it strains.
India's energy transition: the 2030 target and grid
India has already crossed 50% non-fossil installed electricity capacity — the COP26 target it had set for 2030 — reaching the milestone in mid-2025, about five years early, and by 31 July 2026 non-fossil capacity had passed 300 GW of a roughly 552 GW total (over 54%). But installed capacity is not the same as electricity generated: coal still produces most of the country's power, and the binding constraints have shifted from building panels to the parts the Ministry of Power owns — the transmission grid, storage to firm up intermittent supply, and the finances of the state distribution utilities. Peak demand hit a record 270.82 GW in May 2026, and a new National Electricity Policy — the first since 2005 — went to the Cabinet for inter-ministerial consultation in September. This maintained brief tracks what the target actually measures, how far along India is, and where the transition is stuck.
India's judiciary: appointments, pendency and reform
India is almost the only major democracy in which the higher judiciary chooses its own judges — through the collegium, a creature of Supreme Court judgments rather than statute. Parliament's attempt to replace it with a National Judicial Appointments Commission was struck down in 2015, and the collegium has run ever since without a finalised Memorandum of Procedure. On top sits a pendency crisis — more than 5.6 crore cases across all courts and about 95,000 at the Supreme Court — which drove the 2026 expansion of the Court from 34 to 38 judges, now enacted by Parliament; with the October 2026 appointments, 37 seats are filled. The Court is meanwhile adjudicating another appointments contest, over the panel that selects the Election Commission. This is the maintained topic brief on where it stands as of 2026-10-07.
India's semiconductor strategy: the state of play
India is spending heavily to build a domestic semiconductor industry it has never had, betting large state incentives that it can move from chip design, where it is already strong, into assembly and fabrication, where it is not. As of October 2026, twelve units carrying more than Rs 1.64 lakh crore of investment have been approved under Semicon 1.0; what has actually started operating is assembly and packaging, not fabrication, and the Rs 1,27,500 crore Semicon 2.0 has been notified but has approved nothing yet. This is the maintained topic brief on where that effort stands and what still has to be proven.
India's fiscal stance: the Budget and the debt path
The Ministry of Finance's FY2026-27 Union Budget set the Union fiscal deficit at 4.3% of GDP (Rs 16.96 lakh crore), down from 4.4% in 2025-26 — a target the Controller General of Accounts' provisional accounts show was met, with the 2025-26 deficit at 97.5% of the revised estimate. Five months into 2026-27 the deficit stood at Rs 7.10 lakh crore, 41.9% of the full-year target against 38.1% a year earlier, as capital spending (41.7% of budget) and subsidies ran ahead and net tax revenue (29.2%) lagged. Gross GST collections rose 14.7% in September 2026 and 11.6% in the first half of the year. Consolidation runs off a stated anchor of keeping central debt on a declining path toward around 50% of GDP by March 2031; the Sixteenth Finance Commission has separately recommended a central deficit of 3.5% of GDP by 2030-31. This brief tracks what the stance is, how it was reached, and the range of positions held on whether the pace of consolidation is right. State of play as of 2026-10-07.
India's internal-security consolidation
The Ministry of Home Affairs has organised its internal-security effort around three long-running theatres — Left-Wing Extremism, Jammu & Kashmir terrorism and Northeast insurgency — and set 31 March 2026 as a deadline to eliminate Naxalism nationwide. In May 2026 the Home Minister declared the country "by and large" free of all three; the official trend data shows a steep multi-year decline, while critics point to residual Maoist activity. Since then the ministry's public emphasis has shifted to counter-terrorism: PRAHAAR, a seven-pillar national counter-terrorism policy and strategy, new UAPA designations including a cross-border smuggling network, and operations in Jammu and Kashmir. This is the maintained topic brief on where that consolidation stands and how its success is contested.
Answers on India
Straight answers to what people ask about India — each links to the full dossier.
What is the Election Commission of India? +
The Election Commission of India is the permanent constitutional body that runs the country's elections. Under Article 324 of the Constitution it holds the superintendence, direction and control of the electoral rolls and of elections to Parliament, the State Legislatures, and the offices of the President and Vice-President. A three-member commission — a Chief Election Commissioner and two Election Commissioners with equal powers — it also enforces the Model Code of Conduct once polls are called. It is the referee of Indian democracy, and its independence is the institution's central claim.
Full dossier →What is India’s defence self-reliance (Atmanirbharta) push? +
Defence self-reliance — Atmanirbharta — is the organising goal of India's defence-industrial policy: build at home what the armed forces once imported, and sell the surplus abroad. As of mid-2026 the Ministry of Defence reports the value of defence production at about ₹1.78 lakh crore and record exports of ₹38,424 crore for FY2025-26, on a policy scaffold of the Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020, positive indigenisation lists, iDEX and two defence corridors. The headline curve is steep; the contested questions are how "indigenous" is counted, how much high-end dependence remains, and how the ₹3 lakh crore production and ₹50,000 crore export targets the ministry has set for 2029 are tracking. Since July 2026 the ministry has added a sixth DPSU indigenisation list of 405 items, loosened defence-export licensing, and approved transfer of DRDO's conventional-missile technology to industry. This is the maintained topic brief.
Full dossier →What is the status of the India–China border dispute? +
India and China are Asia's two civilisational powers and nuclear-armed neighbours whose 3,488 km disputed Himalayan boundary — the Line of Actual Control — has never been formally demarcated. The relationship swings between deep economic interdependence and recurring military standoffs, most gravely the 2020 Galwan Valley clash, the first deadly border fighting in 45 years. Since the October 2024 patrolling arrangement the two governments have been normalising ties step by step; in August 2026 their Special Representatives set up an expert group to pursue an "early harvest" on boundary delimitation, while each side continues to assert its claims on the map.
Full dossier →How are judges appointed in India? +
The Judiciary is the third branch of the Indian state and the guardian of its Constitution. An integrated single hierarchy runs from the Supreme Court of India at the apex, through the High Courts of the states, down to the district and subordinate courts. Through judicial review it can strike down laws and executive action, and through the "basic structure" doctrine it limits even Parliament's power to amend the Constitution. Uniquely among the world's major democracies, the higher judiciary also selects its own members — through the collegium — which is the institution's most contested feature.
Full dossier →What is India’s strategic autonomy? +
Strategic autonomy is the organising principle of Indian foreign policy: the insistence on independent decision-making, unbound by formal alliances, so that India can partner with rival powers simultaneously and on its own terms. It is the post-Cold-War evolution of Non-Alignment into what is often called "multi-alignment" — deepening ties with the United States while retaining Russia, and engaging China inside BRICS and the SCO even amid rivalry.
Full dossier →Which ministry handles India’s foreign policy? +
The Ministry of External Affairs is the Government of India's department for the conduct of foreign relations — diplomacy, treaties, the diaspora, and representation abroad. It runs India's embassies and high commissions and is the lead agency for the country's borders diplomacy, multilateral engagement, and consular services.
Full dossier →What is IndiaStand? +
IndiaStand is an independent India intelligence desk. It maintains a sourced dossier for every Indian ministry, state, service arm and institution — 90 desks and 91 briefs today — with the 1947→present record on each and a source on every claim, plus implementation trackers and state comparisons that separate what was announced from what is documented. Organisations commission it for reviewed research on the India questions they need answered; it describes and explains, and does not forecast or advise.
Full dossier →Topic briefs
All 89 topic briefsLong-term, maintained analyses of major topics — updated as they evolve.
Andaman and Nicobar Islands: a frontier UT
The Andaman and Nicobar Islands is the most centralised unit in the Indian federation: a Union Territory with no legislative assembly, no council of ministers and no Chief Minister, administered directly by the Union through a Lieutenant Governor and financed on the Union Budget through the Ministry of Home Affairs. Its ~380,581 residents (2011 Census) send a single member to the Lok Sabha — held by the BJP after the 2024 general election — and none to the Rajya Sabha; the territory has no assembly and so voted in no 2026 state election. Its economy is small (GSDP of the order of Rs 12,500 crore in 2023-24) but its per-capita income sits above the national average, and its weight in the Republic is strategic rather than demographic or fiscal — the tri-service Andaman and Nicobar Command and the Union's largest greenfield programme, the Great Nicobar development plan. What is settled is the direct Union administration and the existence of the Nicobar tribal reserves; what is contested is the scale, terms and tribal and ecological cost of the Great Nicobar build-out.
Andhra Pradesh: a coastal successor state
Andhra Pradesh is the residuary successor state left by the 2014 bifurcation: just under five crore people, 25 Lok Sabha seats, and a coastal, delta-and-port economy whose GSDP the state budgets at about Rs 19.75 lakh crore for 2026-27. It is a revenue-deficit state carrying outstanding liabilities of around 36% of GSDP, still building a capital at Amaravati — which Parliament declared the state's capital by statute in April 2026 — and still finishing the Polavaram national project. Its standing government was elected in June 2024, when the TDP-led NDA (TDP, Jana Sena, BJP) took 164 of 175 Assembly seats and the YSRCP fell to 11; Andhra Pradesh did not vote in 2026. The state's defining arguments with the Union are all inherited from bifurcation — a lapsed promise of special category status, the financing of Amaravati and Polavaram, revenue-deficit and resource-division claims under the Reorganisation Act, and Krishna-Godavari water sharing with Telangana — none of which turn on which party holds office. This is the maintained topic brief on where all of that stands as of 2026-10-07.
Arunachal Pradesh: a Union-underwritten frontier
As of 7 October 2026, Arunachal Pradesh is governed by a BJP administration that holds 46 of the 60 assembly seats won at the April 2024 election — a House with a single Congress member as its formal opposition and ten seats that were returned unopposed. The state did not vote in the 2026 round; its mandate is the standing 2024 one. Two facts organise everything else. First, it is a special-category frontier state whose government spends a sum equal to roughly 85% of its GSDP and draws about 83% of its revenue receipts from the Centre — the Union is the dominant fact of state finance regardless of party, which is why the 16th Finance Commission's cut in its share of central taxes, from 1.76% to 1.35% for 2026-31, shows up directly as a fall in the 2026-27 budget. Second, Article 371H writes the Governor's special responsibility for law and order into the state's charter, and nearly four-fifths of the territory is claimed by China, so the seams with the Centre run through security and sovereignty, not only money. The live contest is the Siang mega-hydropower scheme, opposed by downstream indigenous communities and justified by New Delhi partly as a counter to China's upstream dam.
Assam: a border, tea and hydrocarbon economy
Assam is the most populous state of India's Northeast — 31.2 million people at the 2011 Census — and the residual parent unit from which four other states were carved. Its economy runs on tea, crude oil and natural gas over a broad agrarian base, but its budget is transfer-dependent: about 64% of 2026-27 revenue receipts are budgeted to come from the Centre. Since May 2026 it has been governed by a BJP-led National Democratic Alliance returned for a third consecutive term, with 102 of 126 assembly seats, and in September 2026 its Uniform Civil Code received the President's assent. What makes Assam constitutionally singular is that citizenship is administered here against a 1971 cut-off that applies to no other state, and large tracts are governed through Sixth Schedule autonomous councils rather than ordinary districts — so the centre-state relationship turns on identity and territory as much as on money.
Bihar: demographic weight, no industrial base
As of 7 October 2026, Bihar is governed by an NDA coalition returned in the November 2025 assembly election, which gave the alliance 202 of 243 seats (BJP 89, JD(U) 85) against 35 for the Mahagathbandhan on a 67.25% turnout; since 15 April 2026 the Chief Minister's office has been held by the BJP, its first tenure in the post, after the JD(U) incumbent moved to the Rajya Sabha. The structural fact about the state is the mismatch its 2000 bifurcation created: it carries roughly a twelfth of India's voters and 40 Lok Sabha seats on the lowest per-capita income in the Union — per-capita GSDP of Rs 76,490 in 2024-25 against an all-India Rs 2,34,859 — and a budget that leans on Union transfers and borrowing, with a 2025-26 fiscal deficit revised to 11.8% of GSDP. The live Centre–state seams are the denied claim to Special Category Status (refused again in 2024, replaced by a project package), the caste-survey reservation law struck down in 2024, the Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls that was first run here and upheld by the Supreme Court in 2026, and the recurring Kosi flooding that runs across the Nepal border. This is the maintained topic brief on where the state's political economy and its relationship with the Union now stand.
Chandigarh: a shared capital under Union rule
Chandigarh is the Republic's clearest constitutional anomaly: a Union Territory that is the shared capital of Punjab and Haryana while belonging to neither, with no legislative assembly, no chief minister and no council of ministers. It is administered directly by the Union under Article 239 through an Administrator, an office the Governor of Punjab has held concurrently since 1984, and its entire footprint in Parliament is a single Lok Sabha seat, held since 2024 by the Indian National Congress. Its 2011 population of 1,055,450 sat on 114 sq km, almost wholly urban, and its per-capita income of about Rs 4.3 lakh is among the highest of any unit of the Union — an administrative and services economy, not a productive base. The defining fault line is not fiscal devolution but ownership: the 1985 Rajiv–Longowal commitment to transfer the city to Punjab was never executed, and every administrative change — the 2022 shift to central service rules, the 2025 proposal to bring the territory under Article 240 — is read as a move for or against Punjab's standing claim. What is settled is that Chandigarh has no assembly and is ruled from the Centre; what is contested is who the city ultimately belongs to.
Chhattisgarh: a mineral-and-forest state
As of 7 October 2026, Chhattisgarh is governed by the BJP, which won 54 of the 90 assembly seats in December 2023 and displaced a Congress government; the state did not vote in the 2026 cycle and this is its standing dispensation. It is a resource-rich, per-capita-poor state — India's second-largest coal producer and home to the Bhilai steel and Korba power complexes — whose people sit below the national per-capita income line and roughly a third of whom are Scheduled Tribes. Its distinguishing feature in the federation is a collision of constitutional logics inside its own borders: the mineral endowment the budget depends on lies largely under Fifth Schedule Scheduled Areas in the Bastar division, which has been the principal theatre of Left-Wing Extremism and where the Union's internal-security machinery operates most continuously on State List ground. The live Centre-state arguments run along four seams — the security-and-Fifth-Schedule question in Bastar, mineral fiscal federalism after the 2024 Supreme Court royalty-taxation ruling, the Mahanadi water dispute with Odisha, and an unresolved reservation-quantum question tangled in the Governor's assent power. This is the maintained topic brief on where all of that stands.
Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu: a fiscal UT
Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu is one of the smallest units of the Union and one of the few with no legislature at all: no assembly, no council of ministers, no Chief Minister. It is run directly by an Administrator under Article 239, with the President legislating for it by regulation under Article 240, so its "government" is a Union department answering to the Ministry of Home Affairs rather than an elected cabinet. Its economy is an artefact of that position — decades of Union tax and excise concessions built the Silvassa and Daman manufacturing belts and the most male-skewed sex ratios recorded in India — and the erosion of that arbitrage under GST is the defining shift in its political economy. Its only electoral verdict is at the Union level: it did not and could not vote in the 2026 assembly cycle, and at the 2024 general election the BJP held the tribal-reserved Dadra and Nagar Haveli seat while an independent took Daman and Diu from the BJP, which had held it through the preceding general elections. What is settled is the constitutional architecture; what is contested is the democratic deficit, the survival of the tax-arbitrage industrial model, and the claim of tribal land against industrial expansion.
Latest dispatches
All briefs- 2026-07-02
India–China delimitation talks resume
India and China have moved their boundary dialogue from crisis management toward delimitation. After WMCC rounds in May and August 2026, the 25th Special Representatives' talks in Beijing on 25 August agreed eight points, including tasking an Expert Group on Boundary Delimitation with an "early harvest" and adding two military meeting points and two hotlines; President Xi and Prime Minister Modi then met in New Delhi on 12 September. Alongside the process track runs a claim track: India recorded 27 names in Arunachal Pradesh on its maps in August, China protested, and in October India added 28 names in Ladakh. The dialogue widens; the territorial dispute is unresolved.
- 2026-07-03
Operation Sindoor: a casualty-disclosure dispute
A year after Operation Sindoor, the government named six armed-forces personnel killed in it and had their names inscribed at the National War Memorial. The opposition says that contradicts what the Defence Minister told Parliament in July 2025 and has moved a breach-of-privilege notice; the ministry says nothing was hidden and that the earlier remark denied pilot deaths specifically. This brief reads the contest, its timeline and its notably domestic footprint.
How this is made
Open sources, in parallel
Official ministry sites, Google News and GDELT are pulled together and de-duplicated. No paid data.
Provenance on everything
Every claim carries its source, tiered official → reference → news → analysis. Cross-source corroboration is tracked.
Analysis, not prediction
We cover seats of power, not personalities, and describe the state of play — no forecasts, no recommendations.
Last updated 2026-10-07.